THE JAILERS OF THE DESERT

CDD 103 English

THE JAILERS OF THE DESERT

In 2021, journalist Olivier Dubois, who was about to speak with a leader of one of the jihadist groups, was kidnapped by one of them (the Al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM) and held hostage for nearly two years before being released in 2023. He has just published a book ("Prisonnier du désert" - Michel Lafon - 2025) testifying to his long detention in the middle of the desert. This testimony offers an interesting reflection on the situation in the Sahel, its evolution and its prospects (see also the interview he gave to Jeune Afrique on February 1, 2025).

Beyond the actual account of Dubois' kidnapping and captivity, some geopolitical subjects emerge again from this testimony

The desert: a geographical reality but also a metaphor for underdevelopment

The beauty of the desert inspires beautiful pages for Dubois. But they also underline the cruelty of this prison "in the open air" (and in full sun!) from which any attempt to escape seems futile, as in this immensity, there is nowhere to go that is not accessible to the kidnappers in a few minutes. But to this cruelty is added another dimension, that of a part of Mali that has been left abandoned and left behind for development. Because Dubois was transferred several times to different desert "prisons". He therefore circulated during his detention. In this desert, he saw how anointed everything was missing, even the most basic equipment, for water for example. Of course, the desert is powerful, but there are countries that have been able to make them habitable spaces where man is not always fighting against the elements without the help of some technology. In this respect, northern Mali is one of those areas that most often ignores even simple sections of bitumen or water distribution systems, outside the vicinity of a few towns or military bases. The Malian junta has boasted of having retaken the Kidal base from the rebels with their Russian auxiliaries Wagner, but this has not changed anything. Outside Kidal, the desert remains the desert but it is now in the hands, politically and militarily, of the jihadists and the Tuareg rebel movements who are fighting for the independence of northern Mali. Hence a fundamental difference between these two movements: the separatists want to make this desert an autonomous country and promote its development, while the Islamists only use it to one day establish a caulk throughout the country, possibly beyond that throughout the Sahel.

It is therefore a strange fate for this northern Mali and its most desert part to be disputed by three groups, none of which has the same stakes or the same objectives.

The endogenization of the rebellion, jihadist or pro-independence

The immediate consequence of this abandonment of territory by the Malian junta, beyond the symbolic victory won in Kidal, its dramatic underdevelopment, reinforced by the ingratitude of nature itself, is simple. The populations who live there find themselves in fact only faced with rebel or jihadist groups and are dependent on them for their simple survival. In his own way, that of a prisoner without freedom of movement or speech, Dubois observes him very clearly in many scenes. According to him, the residents he met were sympathizers of the group responsible for his abduction. It is always difficult to know whether this "sympathy" is mainly forced, because of this dependence of the inhabitants. But other testimonies show the extent to which, not only in Mali but also in Burkina Faso or Niger, a growing part of the population does not necessarily adhere to all the Islamists' theses but sees little other perspective. Especially young people, who are so often idle. In this regard, we can remember what the ousted Nigerien president, Mohamed Bazoum, said so lucidly about his own country. He explained how the allocation of a motorcycle and a Kalashnikov immediately transformed an unemployed young man into a licensed terrorist. This endogenization of jihadism is therefore first and foremost the result of this abandonment by the states concerned, apparently democratic or juntas, and of aggravated underdevelopment. In their own way, the leaders of these groups also use this argument by declaring, according to a statement reported by Olivier Dubois, that "as long as corruption and nepotism reign" they will continue their fight.

This observation does not only apply to Islamists. It is just as valid for the separatists, even if it would be presumptuous to want to assess the current balance of power. The Front for the Liberation of Azawad (FLA) in particular seems to have recently been strengthened, with the ostensible support of Algeria and the more discreet support of France. And his relationship to the populations of the populations of the cities, villages or parts of the desert that he controls is the same. Membership, perhaps forced, because their survival depends on it, but which, in any case, is better than that of a state that has abandoned them. Or worse, who was guilty of atrocious crimes against them. The list of such abuses is already long.

The deadlocks of the purely military solution

We therefore have every reason to think that the fight of the Malian junta, like the other juntas, Burkinabe or Nigerien, is lost in advance, against groups that control a large part of the territory and have been able, at least temporarily, to win the confidence of the populations. Indeed, only the military aspect of these governments' action programmes is highlighted. The massacres of Moura in Mali and more recently of Barsalogho (see in particular my column 84 of September 15, 2024) provide a perfect illustration of this. Once again, this observation is strange, coming from officers who are supposed to have studied all the liberation movements of previous centuries in their military schools! This error of the "all-military" option continues to confuse order and brutal repression. For any restoration of order presupposes that the basic issues of development, water, food, housing and security, are simultaneously addressed. The French had already made the same mistake with Operation Barkhane. An old colonial reflex, no doubt! But the fact that these Malian Armed Forces (FAMA), whose troops often come from these same regions, do not deploy another strategy proves the extent to which these juntas are cut off from a large part of their populations. Or that it is their Russian auxiliaries who are calling the shots. Above all, it is likely that the leaders of the juntas will live in their barracks, with the sole support of urban elites who see only their own interests!

The testimony of this "prisoner of the desert" that was Olivier Dubois is thus added to the long list of all those who see little way out of the gradual victory of the Islamists in the Sahel in the Sahel, the three capitals gradually falling like dominoes, Bamako, then Ouagadougou, then Niamey. At the same time, taking advantage of an alliance of circumstance, the Front for the Liberation of Azawad could recover northern Mali for its own benefit and with the support of Ajger. A sad scenario of which it is difficult to see how the three juntas, even allied within the AES, could prevent it from happening. Unless, in another scenario, a massive intervention by allied powers, Libyan-style. But which would only result in adding chaos to chaos.

Jean-Paul de GAUDEMAR

February 9, 2025

You can find this column, in French, by subscribing free of charge to my "jeanpauldegaudemar.substack.com" platform or in English by subscribing free of charge to my "jpdegaudemar.substack.com" platform

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